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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-Hospitals Held Strictly Liable in
Tort for the Transfusion of Hepatitis Infected Blood
In May of 1960, Mrs. Frances Cunningham was admitted into the
MacNeal Memorial Hospital, Berwyn, Illinois. In the course of her
treatment, she received several transfusions of whole blood. She sub-
sequently contracted a serum hepatitis infection requiring her to have
additional hospitalization.'
Mrs. Cunningham then filed suit against the hospital, seeking re-
covery for further hospitalization and medical treatment, and also for
permanent injuries. Following the adoption of the theory of strict lia-
bility in tort by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1965,2 a second
amended complaint, alleging strict liability against the hospital was
filed. This complaint alleged that the defendant hospital, as an ancil-
lary part of its services rendered to the plaintiff, sold and supplied her
blood for the purposes of transfusion in the treatment of her condi-
tion. She submitted that the blood had been received by the defendant
in the commercial line of distribution from a blood bank, and that the
blood supplied by defendant to plaintiff was defective and in an un-
reasonably dangerous condition at the time it left the control of the
defendant. Plaintiff's allegation concluded that as a direct and proxi-
mate result of such defect, she was infected with serum hepatitis,
damaging her in the sum of $50,000.3
Defendant responded by moving for a judgment on the ground that
a cause of action in strict tort liability does not apply to the transfusion
of blood by a hospital as a part of its services rendered to patients.4
The Circuit Court of Cook County sustained defendant's motion, and
the plaintiff took an appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First Judicial District. In a two-to-one decision the Appellate Court
held that the second amended complaint did state a cause of action in
strict tort liability, reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court.
After the Appellate Court certified the question as one of importance,
the defendant then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.5
1. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 113 M11. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d
733 (1969).
2. Suvada v. White, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
3. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, - Ill. 2d -, N.E.2d - (1970).
4. Id.
5. See Ill. Supreme Court Rule 316.
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HELD: Affirmed
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff had stated a cause
of action on the theory of strict tort liability, holding that the transfu-
sion of blood fell within the scope of the decision in Suvada v. White
Motor Co.6
The decision in Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital is sig-
nificant because it is the first decision that authorized the application of
strict tort liability in a case where the transfusing of blood by a hospital
was at issue. It rejected over fifteen years of decisions and statutes
from other jurisdictions which had specifically exempted blood transfu-
sions from strict tort and warranty liability.7
The theory of strict liability in tort was first adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Suvada v. White Motor Co., holding that when a man-
ufacturer sells a defective product that is unreasonably dangerous, the
Illinois courts will not look to the old theory of warranty but rather to
strict tort liability.8
Courts have given effect to two theories to achieve products liability:
(i) warranty and (ii) strict tort liability. In Suvada, the Illinois Su-
preme Court established strict tort liability as the principle theory ap-
plicable in Illinois, leaving small scope for the concept of warranty and
its concomitant requirement of privity. 9
Strict liability, as embodied in Suvada, is the imposition of liability
wihout negligence on a seller of a defective product. The rule sub-
jects a seller to liability for physical harm or property damage to the
user or consumer despite the fact that all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of the product has been exercised. Proof of negligence is
not essential to the imposition of liability, and the lack of it is imma-
terial.10
6. See, for example, Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d
792 (1954); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151,
132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); cf. California Health and Safety Code § 1623, which pro-
vides, "The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma,
blood products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the
same, or any of them, into the human body shall be construed to be, and is declared
to be for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a service by each and every per-
son, firm, or corporation participating therein, and shall not be construed to be, and is
declared not to be, a sale of such whole blood, plasma, blood products, or derivatives,
for any purpose or purposes whatsoever." and similar statutes.
8. See note 2, supra.
9. Id. See also, W. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960);
W. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966). Tort liability ap-
plies only in cases of personal injury and property damage.
10. Id. See also, N. Ozmon, Products Liability under the Suvada Theory, 55
Ill. B.J. 906 (1967).
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Warranty principles were discussed in the Cunningham case because
of the array of precedent on point." Where the warranty theory has
been invoked, courts have considered troublesome questions with re-
gard to hepatitis contaminated blood. The issue of whether the blood
transfusion constituted a sale, and whether such a "sale" was of "goods",
required resolution. Under existing warranty law, only a sale of goods
gives rise to a warranty.
The only case prior to Cunningham which held that transfusions
constitute a sale of blood, rather than a service was Russell v. Com-
munity Blood Bank, Inc. 2 where the appellate court of Florida held that
a cause of action for breach of warranty was stated against a blood bank.
That court distinquished the blood bank from a hospital on the ground
that its sole purpose was to collect and distribute blood for a specific
monetary consideration. Ruling that the transfer of blood from the
bank to the patient was not a service, but rather a sale to which a war-
ranty was attached, the Court stated:
It seems to us a distortion to take what is, at least arguably, a sale,
twist it into the shape of a service, and then employ this trans-
formed material in erecting the framework of a major policy de-
cision.'3
Through case and statutory law, the vast majority of jurisdictions
have taken the position that, for all purposes, the transfusing of blood
is not a sale but a service.1 4  The apparent reluctance of these jurisdic-
tions to impose warranty in contaminated blood cases is possibly caused
by the fact that many of the defendants have been charitable institu-
tions or non-profit corporations, and that hepatitis virus in blood is
said to be both undetectible and unremovable. These were the reasons
that the court in Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital" emphasized in
holding defendant hospital not subject to liability for breach of an im-
plied warranty. That case involved facts similar to those in Cunning-
11. See note 3, supra.
12. 185 So. 2d 749 (1966).
13. Id. at 752.
14. For examples see Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp. and Balkowitsch v. Minneap-
olis War Memorial Blood Bank, Ind. note 7, supra; Gile v. Kennewick Public Hosp.
District, 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Fischer v. Wilmington General Hos-
pital, 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (1959); Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research
Institute and Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Texas Civ. App. 1961); Dibblee v. Dr.
W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961);
Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Koenig v. Mil-
waukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964); Whitehurst v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. App. 1965). Note 3, supra. At least
25 jurisdictions have enacted such statutes. See also applicable statutes, for example,
West's Ann. Health and Safety Code § 1623, note 6, supra.
15. Id.
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ham. The court reasoned that the contract between patient and hospi-
tal was one for healing services and that a contract for the sale of blood
could not be separated from it. However, they implied that the nature
of the hospital's business, that of healing the sick, and its position as a
charitable or non-profit corporation, should exempt it from liability.' 6
In Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank,17 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court made explicit what the court in Perlmutter had
only implied, that a non-profit or charitable corporation should not be-
held to the same standards as a commercial business where the sale of
hepatitis contaminated blood is at issue. In addition to relying on the
charitable policy consideration in deciding no sale existed, the court in
Balkowitsch relied on available scientific literature showing that it was
impossible to detect the presence of hepatitis virus in blood.' 8
In products cases, courts have been moved to adopt strict tort lia-
bility for policy considerations.' 9  These policies include: (i) protec-
tion of the public interest in human life, health and property; (ii) plac-
ing the burden of injury or damages on those best able to foresee ex-
penses and spread the cost; and (iii) a desire by the courts to force the
manufacturer to improve his product.20
In blood cases, courts have been required to evaluate the special ef-
fects which these considerations have upon hospitals. First to be con-
sidered would be whether the burden placed upon the hospital under
the strict tort liability doctrine is a protection of the public interest in
human life and health. The hospital is pledged to doing work, which
by its very nature, is the protection of human life and health. It may
seem inequitable to inflict such an institution with the burden and ex-
pense of strict liability.
16. A case relied upon by the Perlmutter court was Babcock v. Nudelman, 367
Ill. 626. Although not precisely on point with the issue raised in Perlmutter, the court
stated: "The furnishing of tangible personal property such as eyeglasses to a pur-
chaser, under the circumstances of this case, is merely incidental to the services
rendered . . .", at 630.
The case involved the imposition of the Retailers Occupation Tax upon optometrists.
The Court held that they were not subject to the tax, and indicated that this is also
true of physicians who must necessarily furnish medicines or surgical dressings, and
dentists who furnish inlays, fillings, crowns, etc.
However, it seems that a logical distinction exists between the Court's interest in
collecting a tax for the state and the interest it has in protecting the health and prop-
erty of an individual.
17. See note 7, supra.
18. Id.
19. See note 9, supra.
20. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c,
(1965) Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944),
Traynor concurring, and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897 (1962).
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Second, when a court applies the policy of "spreading the cost" to a
hospital, as the seller of a defective product, it is adding those costs to
the already high price of hospital care for each patient. It is question-
able whether it is desirable to spread costs among a class of people al-
ready faced with the adversity of illness.
Finally, if a court desires that a hospital improve this product, it is
saying to the institution, "Find an effective method of detecting the virus
and removing it from blood." The question arises as to whether hos-
pitals and their scientists will work faster and be more successful as a
result of judicial pressure.
Jurisdictions like Illinois, which have adopted strict tort liability in
products cases,2 have generally adopted the form set forth in § 402A
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.2 2  The strict tort
liability theory as embodied in the RESTATEMENT does not require
the traditional warranty elements of buyer reliance, notice of injury,
disclaimer and privity of contract.2" The rationale for the rejection of
these warranty requirements was the hardship which they placed upon
the injured party.
In strict tort liability, a plaintiff need only prove that a seller sup-
plied a defective product which was in an unreasonably dangerous con-
dition at the time it left seller's control, and that this dangerous condi-
tion was the proximate cause of plaintiff-consumer's injury.24 No issue
as to privity can or need be raised, as the theory applies to anyone who
becomes the ultimate consumer.25
The issue in Cunningham was whether the transfusion of blood fell
within the scope of strict liability in tort. Before the court was required
to determine whether a "sale" was present, it was called upon to decide
whether blood was a "product" under that theory.
21. See note 2, supra.
22. § 402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
23. 1d. at Comments a and m.
24. Id. Implicit in Suvada is this requirement. . . See note 10, supra.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965).
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The federal government controls the sale of blood as a product in in-
terstate commerce. The Federal Trade Commission in filing its opin-
ion in the Matter of Community Blood Bank of Kansas City Area, Inc.26
rejected the theory that blood is not a product, as defendants in that
case had contended, when charged with illegally restraining the ex-
change, sale and distribution of human blood. In doing so, the Com-
mission noted United States v. Calise,27 where blood was held to be a
serum, causing it to fall within the scope of the Federal Mislabeling of
Package or Containers Law, which indicates that it is a product.28
Rather than citing these decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court in Cun-
ningham relied upon the RESTATEMENT -9 which provides that prod-
ucts include both articles which have undergone some processing and
articles which have not. Perhaps the reason for Illinois' adoption of
this position was best expressed by the appellate court in Cunningham,
stating:
It would appear that the real reason some would refrain from
calling human blood a product is the belief that those dealing in
it are doctors, hospitals and blood banks, who perform a meritorious
service for the community and are entitled to preferential treatment
from the law. However, our Supreme Court has indicated that a
hospital should not be treated any differently from any other or-
ganization; at least, insofar as the rules of negligence are concerned.
Darling v. Charleston Hospital, 33 I11. 2d 326, 211 NE2d 253. In
other words, we feel that those favoring special protection for
hospitals of the kind they had enjoyed before the Darling decision,
would read back into the law a preferential treatment for hospitals
by circuitous means, such as concluding that blood is not a product,
and that those handling it are to be treated differently from those
handling "true" products . 0
The Illinois Supreme Court then turned to the issue of whether the
transfusion of blood was a service rather than a sale.31 In Perlmutter,
the court resolved this issue by reasoning that the thing bargained for
was a service, ie. medical skill and technology. The court viewed a
blood transfusion as being only ancillary to this activity and not divisible
from it.a2 The Cunningham court, noting that Perlmutter had been
decided upon policy bases which it rejected, adopted the reasoning set
26. Docket number 8519, reported in Trade Regul. Rep. 22, 023 (June 8, 1964).
27. 217 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y., 1962).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 262(b) (1964). No person shall falsely label container of any
virus, serum, toxin, antitoxin, or other product. ...
29. See note 23, supra.
30. See note 1, supra, at 80.
31. Or a placing into the stream of commerce, see note 25, supra.
32. See note 7, supra.
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forth in Russell; that, as to a blood bank, a sale did exist. Like the
Florida court in Russell, the Illinois Supreme Court could find no logi-
cal distinction between a blood transfusion and the sale of a product.
The court examined the similar procedures of blood banks and hospi-
tals, and held that if the former was a sale, so, obviously was the latter.
Related to the sale-versus-service issue was whether the hospital could
be a seller as embodied in the RESTATEMENT if it were not in the
business of selling. The hospital contended that its business was that
of providing a service ie. healing, and therefore, it could not be a
seller of any products. The court, however, indicated that the theory
of strict tort liability encompasses anyone who manufactures, distrib-
utes, wholesales, sells or supplies the product.33 It is not necessary that
their principle occupation be that of a seller. All that is required is
that they do in fact sell or supply the product.
Once it was determined that a sale of a product existed, it was neces-
sary to consider whether infected blood is defective and whether strict
liability should apply when, arguably, no scientific method of detection
of the virus presently exists. The Cunningham court recognized that
the theory of strict liability requires a product to be in a defective con-
dition as a basis for recovery. 34  This requirement of a defect differen-
tiates strict from absolute liability."5 Its proof being a prerequisite to
recovery, the meaning of "defective" is crucial in strict tort liability. A
"defective condition" has been defined as one not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer which would be unreasonably dangerous to him.36
Wholesome blood then, is not in a defective condition; it is safe for
normal consumption.3 7 Virused blood, however, is not. Blood is not
an inherently defective product, so no supplier, aware of the actual
presence of the hepatitis in a given blood sample, would market the
product when a supply of nonvirused blood is available. The fact that
the supplier is unaware of the defect does not alter the fact of its pres-
ence nor the fact that the product is defective.3 8
In deciding that infected blood was in an unreasonably dangerous
condition, the Illinois Supreme Court considered Comment K of the
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment f (1965).
34. See notes 14 and 23, supra.
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment g (1965).
See also, J. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment g (1965).
37. Id., Comment h.
38. P. Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of
a Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963).
223
1971
Loyola University Law Journal
RESTATEMENT. 9 That section advocates a limited basis for ex-
empting liability in certain cases where the products are "incapable
of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use."40 The defen-
dants sought to include blood within this exception by submitting that
there is no present method for full detection or decontamination of
blood containing the hepatitis virus.
Two points of importance address themselves to this issue. First
whether the "unavoidable unsafe" exemption to the strict tort liability
doctrine was applicable;41 and second, whether strict liability renders
immaterial the fact that the defendant could not have detected the de-
fect in the blood.
A not uncommon analogy is invoked for purposes of applying the
"unavoidably unsafe" exemption, which compares the transfusion of
virused blood to an innoculation of vaccine in the Pasteur treatment of
rabies. This example is expressly contained within Comment K of the
RESTATEMENT,42 and was extensively discussed in the proceedings
leading to the adoption of § 402A.43 The ailments against which vac-
cination and transfusion are directed may lead to death. However, re-
course to either may lead to other serious consequences, though from a
cause other than of the original ailment. The RESTATEMENT ad-
vocates that marketers and suppliers of rabies vaccine ought to be
granted specific exemption from the strict tort liability principle.
But the vaccine example is not truly analogous to contaminated blood.
Rabies vaccine is not defective,44 whereas virused blood is in a defective
condition. Any given sample of the rabies vaccine may result in injury,
depending on the tolerance of the person who is to receive it. Use of the
vaccine will cause unpredictable harm to certain individuals and not to
others.45 It is not the adulterated vaccine, but rather the particular
constitution of the recipient of good vaccine which is responsible for
any resultant harm. The harm, like that accompanying an allergic re-
action, is reactive.46
By contrast, virused blood typifies an example of a product which is
defective. Contaminated blood is defective because of the presence of
a foreign element, ie. the hepatitis virus. Because of its impurity, bad
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k. (1965).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 41 ALl Proceedings 349 (1964).
44. See note 39, supra.
45. 15 Am. Jr. Proof of Facts, p. 638 (1964).
46. Grau v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 324 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1963).
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blood will invariably, and independently of a person's allergic re-
sponses,4 7 produce illness upon being transfused. The defect attendant
to hepatitus infected blood is not in the consumer but in the product.
The second aspect of the issue, that is, whether the fact that the pres-
ence of a hepatitis infection in the blood is, as a practical matter, undis-
coverable should preclude application of the doctrine of strict liability
in tort, was only briefly discussed by the Cunningham court. That
court concluded that to give weight to that factor would "signal a return
to a negligence theory." '48 Deeming that concepts of negligence had
no place in a strict liability in tort action, the court held this factor irrele-
vant.
This resolution of the issue causes implications for the Illinois law of
strict liability in tort which go far beyond the facts in the case. Up to
this time the doctrine had only been applied to products which were de-
fective and should not have been. The products which created liability
were either improperly designed or manufactured.49 It was this fact
that led the Illinois Supreme Court to say in its first opinion in Williams
v. Brown Manufacturing Co., an opinion later withdrawn, that strict
liability in tort is "liability without negligence but it is not liability with-
out fault. '5 0  If, however, it is granted that there is no way that the
virus could have been detected in the blood, Cunningham extends strict
liability in tort to situations where no fault can be predicated on the
part of the defendants.
It must, however, be noted that support for this result can be found in
the decision in Kenower v. Hotels Statler, Co.,5 a Sixth Circuit opinion
cited with approval by the Cunningham court. There, under an im-
plied warranty theory, a vendor was held responsible when a customer
contracted typhoid fever as a result of eating clams infected with ty-
phoid bacilli even though there was no way of determining if the clams
were so infected without destroying their marketability. Yet distinc-
tions can be drawn between Kenower and Cunningham. First, Ken-
ower was an implied warranty case, and fault does not hold the same
position in an action of contract as it does in one sounding in tort. Sec-
147. Allen, Enerson, Barron & Sukes, Pooled Plasma with Little or No Risk of
Homalogous Serum Jaundice, 154 A.M.A.J. 103 (1954). See also, Allen, Advantages of
the Single Transfusion, 164 Ann. Surg. 475 (Sept. 1966).
48. See note 3, supra, at-.
49. See note 2, supra. See also, Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., - ill. -, - N.E.
- (1970).
50. Unpublished opinion, Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company. See 1 Loy-
ola (Chi.) L.J. 388 (1970).
51. 124 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1942).
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ond, and perhaps more significant, is the fact that a vendor may, if he
chooses, elect not to sell clams because of their dangers. No such elec-
tion is often open to a hospital in the case of a blood transfusion. They
must transfuse or the patient will die. Because of his freedom of choice
a clam vendor can be said to have "assumed the risk" of infected clams.
This, in many cases, cannot be said of a hospital.
A final possible ground of distinction lies between Kenower and
Cunningham. In Kenower, the clam market is such that each purchaser
may pay a slightly higher cost and thus spread the risk of unavoidable
illness upon all purchasers of clams. It remains to be seen if this is a
viable alternative in the case of infected blood.
The desirability of spreading the cost to those best able to foresee
and afford the damage was advanced over two decades ago by Justice
Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co."2 He stated that the
manufacturer would be best prepared to assume the burden for in-
juries from a defective product and it would be unjust to ask the un-
suspecting consumer to do so." But are hospitals, like manufac-
turers selling items at a fixed price, able to add to the cost of each item
for the purpose of reimbursing themselves for the expense of consumer
injuries?
When speaking of cost sharing in a blood transfusion situation, it
is first necessary to determine if the added cost is to be spread between
all hospital patients or only those who receive transfusions. If limited
to transfusion recipients it has been suggested that the cost of a pint of
blood would rise from approximately fifty dollars to one hundred and
fifty dollars. 54  This would apparently be the appropriate group over
which to spread the costs by analogy to the infected claim situation. If,
on the other hand, the risk were to be spread over all hospital patients,
it has been estimated that it would increase the cost of a hospital bed
fourteen dollars per patient per day. 5 It may be questioned if patients
who are not in need of transfusions should be required to bear the cost
of the use to those that are. It is likewise true that the hospital patient
is not a person who desires a product and, therefore, must pay for the
risks of that product, but one who is forced by necessity to require it.
On the other hand, this high price of cost socializing indicates the
immensity of the burden which hepatitis places upon an afflicted in-
226
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53. Id. at 462.
54. Chicago Tribune, Voice of The People, October 17, 1970.
55. Medical News, 214 J.A.M.A. 3 (October 19, 1970).
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dividual. Leaving the cost rest where it originally lay seems to be an
alternative which is an undesireable as cost spreading.
Hospitals have claimed that a decision such as Cunningham can pro-
vide no possible incentive for a seller to "improve his product" because
scientists have been unable to find a viable test for screening out the
impure blood. Nevertheless, an increased emphasis upon hepatitis
research has resulted in the reporting of new and better tests. 6
One area apparently overlooked by those concerning themselves with
the legal issues surrounding contaminated blood is that of preventive
control. This potential safeguard is available only at the donor level.
Blood donors and donor stations differ from community to community.
In communities where blood donors are paid professionals, a larger
amount of virused blood is collected than in those consisting of mainly
volunteers. This situation is due to the fact that paid donors come
from lower socio-economic backgrounds and know little of their medi-
cal history. This type of donor is reluctant to discuss that subject, pos-
sibly from fear that he will not be accepted, and will suffer a loss of in-
come.5" In order to implement an effective program of preventive con-
trol, blood banks could enforce more strictly the existing regulations
as to the collection of blood.
Consequences which the Cunningham case will have upon future
patients and hospitals is open to speculation. It is believed that the
hospitals will apply to the Illinois legislature for the adoption of a statute
similar to one already enacted in twenty-five other states. It is ques-
tionable whether this type of solution is desireable because of the hard-
ship which it places upon the individual infected.
The consequences which the Cunningham decision may effect upon
Illinois law the field of strict liability in tort, however, may be much
more far reaching. While the legislature will be forced to decide
whether to spread the cost of serum hepatitis among many or to let it
rest upon the individual, that decision will have little to do with the
fact that Illinois law now seems to disregard the concept of fault in its
application of products liability.
David L. Tomchin
56. See note, Red Blood Cell Washing May Reduce Risk of Hepatitis, 214
J.A.M.A. 678 (October, 1970). Also J. Tullis, J. Hinnin, M. Sproul & R. Nickerson,
Incidence of Post Transfusion Hepatitis in Previously Frozen Blood, 214 J.A.M.A. 719
(October, 1970).
57. P. Galloway, Chicago Sun-Times, October 18, 1970, p. 5.
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